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Drones and the uninsurable security subjects 
 
 
“It is the perpetual dream of power to have its way without the visible exercise of will 
that would produce resistance”  
James Der Derian 
 
 
Abstract (100 words) 
This paper engages with the security dynamics underlying the use of drones and their impact on security 
subjects – individuals and groups that are the ultimate recipients of specific security policies, regardless 
of whether these have beneficial effects on them. Using Mark Duffield’s distinction between the insured 
Global North and the non-insured Global South, this paper discusses how drones generate a radical 
dissociation between the intervener and the intervened that ultimately produces new security 
environments at the margins of the international system. These new security environments are defined 
by the articulation between space, technologies and bodies; bodies of invisible subjects. Bodies that are 
uninsurable.  
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Introduction 
‘Drones’, more specifically Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), have, in the last few years, become a predominant 
term in the international relations’ vocabulary. As technological instruments for 
surveillance, data collection and “targeted killing”, drones have become central to the 
counter-terrorism efforts of a number of countries, from Russia to Israel.1 However, no 
other country has made such an intensive use of UAVs and UCAVs as the US in the 
last decade. Since 2001, the US Armed Forces and the Central intelligence Agency 
(CIA) have been using lethal drone strikes to disrupt and eliminate terrorist 
organisations such as al Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State (IS), implying that 
drone strikes could occur in countries other than those in which the US had a direct 
military engagement, as long as the presence of al Qaeda (or IS) affiliates could be 
verified.2 In the last decade, this practice increased its geographic scope, including 
countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.3 The authority for 
drone strikes in Afghanistan derives from the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) passed by the US Congress shortly after 9/11. The AUMF does not restrict in 
any way the use of military force against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, nor does it represent 
an endpoint to that power.4 Concerning the use of drones in other countries, Michael 
Boyle explains that since there is an assertion that the USA has the right to self-
defence against al Qaeda under international law, the US has the legal arguments to 
expand drone operations against terrorist organisation in Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia.5 Moreover, as these missions do not require the approval of Congress and 
their international legality is questionable.6 In 2013, the US Administration changed 
their policy, restricting the use of drones in targeted killing operations, but as recently 
exemplified in the case of the two American citizens accidentally killed in an Al-Qaida 
compound, the information that is used to conduct these attacks is often highly 
incomplete or inaccurate.7According to the data provided by the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, the US has totalised over 800 strikes in non-combat settings: 
Pakistan (2004-2016), Yemen (2002-2016), Somalia (2007-2016) and Afghanistan 
(2015-2016). If to this we add drone strikes, between 4,946 and 7,464 people have died 
in those countries as a result of US drone strikes.8 With the ongoing war against IS in 
Syria and Iraq, it is likely that numbers will grow significantly in the next year.9  
The employment of drones as military weapons has raised multiple ethical 
questions, which have been profusely discussed in a literature that is mainly concerned 
with both the achievement of a just way of using technology in war contexts and the 
impact technology has on the nature of conflicts.10 They have also been questioned 
from a strategic standpoint: as former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David 
Petraeus, David Kilcullen and former US Army officer Andrew Exum argue in a 
widely discussed New York Times op-ed, the use of drones might ultimately produce 
opposite goals of counterinsurgency, generating resentment rather than winning the 
hearts and minds of local populations.11 This resonates with the views of a group of 
four former US Air Force drone operators – Brandon Bryant, Michael Haas, Stephen 
Lewis, and Cian Westmoreland – who have publicly spoken about their service, for the 
first time in New York on 19 November 2015. They expressed that the killings end up 
aiding terrorist recruitment, namely among younger people eager of avenging unjust 
deaths by drone strikes.12 For Brandon Bryant: “We kill four and create ten 
[terrorists]”, for “If you kill someone’s father or uncle or family member and they’re 
not part of the problem, then all of a sudden these people want revenge”.13 
Finally, the impact of killing by drones has also been felt at a deeper 
psychological level both by the local populations surviving drone strikes and by drone 
operators.14 This has been extensively documented in Living under Drones: death, 
injury, and trauma to civilians from US drone practices in Pakistan, a joint report by 
the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School), 
and the Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law) from September 2012.15 Through 
a series of interviews conducted with drone strikes survivors, their families, witnesses, 
and local medical authorities among other revelant sources, the report clearly illustrates 
how the presence of drones terrorises a powerless population, and has given rise to 
(anticipatory) anxiety and psychological trauma. For survivors and witnesses, the 
symptoms are multiple: fear, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), emotional 
breakdowns, loss of appetite, sleep disturbances, among many others.16 As a result, not 
only have behaviours been affected, as social practices have been disrupted, habits 
broken. Children have ceased to go to school, group gatherings for mourning, burials, 
tribal reunions have been avoided. Tahir Afzal, one of the report’s interviewee, 
summarises:  
 
[Before, e]verybody was involved in their own labor work. We were all busy. But since the drone 
attacks have started, everybody is very scared and everybody is terrorized. . . . People are out of 
business, people are out of schools, because people are being killed by these drone attacks.17 
 
 
As for the psychological impact on the drone operators, the normality of their life 
can be equally interrupted. A study published in 2013 by the US Armed Forces Health 
Surveillance Center has found that drone pilots experience the same rate of mental 
health issues than pilots of manned aircraft. It suggests there is no significant 
difference in the rate of PTSD, depressive disorders, and anxiety disorders between the 
two kinds of pilots, as their risk profile is in fact similar, although drone pilots are said 
to face additional challenges such as lack of deployment rhythm, a lack of combat 
compartmentalisation, fatigue, sleep disorders, social isolation, and sedentary 
behaviour with prolonged screen time.18 In practice, of course, the consequences may 
be devastating. In the aforementioned group of four former drone operators and 
technicians, each of them has declared to suffer from some degree of PTSD: cocaine 
addiction, depression, recurrent nightmares, and suicidal thoughts.19  
The use of drones evidently benefits from the now traditional perception that 
technology saves time, lives and enables progress in warfare.20 They do not convey 
physical risks for soldiers, whilst enabling the execution of missions in remote places, 
often inaccessible to ground forces.21 In that regard, they provide the intervening actor 
with a technical and strategic advantage in eliminating armed resistance. Drones are 
more than just “new tools improving upon a long-standing practice” and, although they 
do have a potentially global reach, they are not globally deployed, at least as killing 
weapons; outside conflict contexts, they are utilised in the very margins of the 
international system; they are geographically selective weapons.22 Ultimately, drones 
reconfigure time and space as a new technology of intervention in the Global South; a 
technology that is based on an “algorithm of racial distinction”.23 As argued by Jamie  
Allinson, they draw a dividing line between “worthy lives” and a subjugated 
population unworthy of life and a priori destined to death.24  
By focusing critically on the particular security dynamics underlying the use of 
drones and their impact on the security subjects – individuals and groups that are the 
recipients of specific security policies, regardless of whether or not they benefit from 
them – the article will offer a reflection on how drones operate as instruments of 
radical life and space differentiation between the margins of the Global South and the 
rest of the world. As it will be argued, drones produce a security subject who is, 
adapting Mark Duffield’s terminology, fundamentally uninsurable.25 The use of these 
robots in killing operations announce the radicalisation of the distinction between the 
‘insured’ in the Global North and the ‘non-insured’ in the Global South, via the 
exposure of the latter to the exclusive security concerns of the former. Drones play a 
productive role in the definition of new marginal spaces in the international system. 
For the inhabitants of these remote areas, not only is there no insurance mechanism, 
private or public, as they are part of a blurred other; guilty until proven the contrary, 
without a specific court on which to present their case or any other public institution to 
safeguard their existence.  
Under these circumstances, the non-insured become uninsurable, a form of life 
that does not deserve specification or attention. This article’s main contribution is to 
unpack how the use of drones symbolises the creation of a new type of subject in the 
Global South, highlighting how the exclusion from the benefits of the global liberal 
order can be constituted in different ways. The article will proceed in two parts. First, it 
will start by setting the conceptual tools framing the use of drones within an 
environment of fundamentally changed perceptions. Hence, issues of time and 
accuracy in the context of airspace sustain the notion that drones alter the spaces for 
security, meaning that they create new environments where both security and 
insecurity are produced. This ambiguous relationship may be understood as a radical 
dissociation between the lives of the subjects of security and the shrinking possibilities 
for secure spaces. Section two will approach in more depth the differentiation between 
these forms of ‘insured’ and ‘non-insured’ life, following Duffield’s terminology. The 
practice of targeted killings by drones will be enhanced to show how uninsurable lives 
of security subjects are made immaterial, giving rise to the quest for the visibility of 
drone victims.  
 
 
1. Changing spaces of (in)security 
Technology has dramatically changed our perception of speed and time as 
announced by Paul Virilio’s work on “dromology” in the late 1970’s:   
Dromology originates from the Greek word, dromos. Hence, dromology is the science of the ride, 
the journey, the drive, the way. To me, this means that speed and riches are totally linked 
concepts. And that the history of the world is not only about the political economy of riches, that 
is, wealth, money, capital, but also about the political economy of speed. If time is money, as 
they say, then speed is power.
26
 
According to Virilio, distances have shortened in terms of time, as has our relation to 
reality, namely through mobile phones, telecommunications media, cyberspace, video-
conferencing, supersonic air travel, etc.27 The ability to move and to do things faster 
thus symbolises the power to apprehend and control reality differently, within a new 
relationship with time. As such, the conduct of warfare has been importantly 
influenced by the acceleration of information transmission – from pigeons, to the 
internet.28 Drawing on Foucault’s panopticon as a model to an extra-terrestrial level of 
discipline and control, Virilio extends the dimensionality of Foucault’s analysis by 
showing how the control of space has been force-multiplied by the control of pace.29 
About the implications of this acceleration upon fear, self-preservation and the bodies, 
Virilio asserts: “In fact, the reduction of distances by the acceleration of movement is 
the effect of the instinct for self-preservation. Speed being simply the production 
of fear, it is flight and not the attack that prompts the violent distancing, the sudden 
burst of speed”.30 
Following this view, the use of drones effectively points to the apotheosis of an 
extra-territorial dimension of politics that is very much driven by issues of time, speed, 
accuracy and efficacy. Virilio’s insights shed some light and structure to the 
conception of “dissociation” in the context of drone warfare, to the extent that 
dissociation occurs at the level of perceptions. With drones, the real-time velocity of 
images corrupts the need for a longer-pace thinking/decision-making of real-time 
effects on information, space, and on the materiality of the bodies. As Bryant states, “It 
was just point... and click”.31 Stephen Lewis, another of the four former drone 
operators of the US Air Force to speak publicly about the topic, recalls on one occasion 
to be given an order to shoot a precise man in the following terms: “One second he was 
there lying on the ground. The next second he was not there anymore”.32 
Such compression of time and space leads to the potential creation of new 
environments. To Peter Adey, aeroplanes can produce “environments” of war and 
terror, of imagined violence in a “biopolitical management of the milieu”.33 This view 
is informed by his argument that a set of geographies, infra-structures, relations and 
processes connect air and land. Much inspired by the relational perspective found in 
Foucault, Adey really enhances how airspace produces important effects on both the 
“aerial-body subject” and the population on the ground, or 
how the flesh and bones of the mobile body – at first so absent from the firework displays of 
‘Shock and Awe’ in Iraq – that life of feelings, emotions, sensations and perceptions, has been 
fundamentally altered by the spaces and geometries of the aeroplane’s movement. The aerial 
body is both the object and medium here. The conditions of its survival require that it is secured 
through all manner of techniques that, in turn, threaten the quality of that life.34  
 
These conditions of overall velocity, which are magnified in the case of drones 
killing civilians, facilitate the political conditions of secrecy that occult the visibility 
and knowability of objects.35 In this sense, there is both a vertical relation between the 
aeroplane that is in the air, and a horizontal relation to the extent “The aeroplane 
depends upon the geography of the earth for it to survive”.36 The idea of verticality is 
also depicted in Eyal Weizman’s conception of a “politics of verticality”, which he 
claims is exercised by Israel in the context of its occupation of Gaza through the use of 
drones.37 This is a particular case, because the Oslo Accord significantly lowered the 
sovereign ceiling of the Palestinian state so as to include only architectural 
construction and low-flying helicopters. As a consequence, the upper layers remain in 
Israel’s control. Weizman explains namely how the use of UAV’s has facilitated even 
more this “near absolute knowledge” of the Palestinian territory: “Every floor in every 
house, every car, every telephone call or radio transmission, even the smallest event 
that occurs on the terrain, can thus be monitored, policed or destroyed from the air”.38    
Precision warfare imposes a vertical relation between the bodies of human 
subjects as well, in that it produces and reinvents bodies, recasts relations among 
bodies, it makes them intelligible and manipulable from the outside, from what Lauren 
Wilcox says is “vantage point of absolute power”.39  
 
Verticality and control (over life) 
The use of drones in the context of the war on terror produces a relation of 
vertical insecurity for the local subjects. Killing drones create an asymmetric relation, 
in which the intervener benefits from an absolute superiority by supposedly knowing 
who, where and when to attack the (supposedly) terrorists. On the one hand, this 
relation derives from a quite recent technological evolution that enables the use of 
drones in such contexts. Although remotely piloted vehicles have been developed since 
the Vietnam War, they have only been used for surveillance since the Gulf War (1990-
1991), been armed and used for assassination by the US since 2001, in Afghanistan.40 
On the other hand, it corresponds to an older trend of “risk-transfer”, in which the risks 
of war and violence are transferred to the enemies and innocent civilians in war zones 
as a form of minimising casualties and life risks for the military.41  
What is not acceptable is the existence of Western casualties as in Western 
societies, “loss of life has become increasingly difficult to justify and ideas of sacrifice 
have waned”.42 As “safety” societies, “permanently on the defensive”, they opt for a 
modality of war that spares the life of their own soldiers, aiming at a legitimate and 
successful formula of a zero-deaths war for the Western nations intervening, whilst the 
deaths of the local civilian population may be countless.43 These dynamics became 
particularly visible after 9/11 when “underdeveloped populations became a global 
concern”.44 Precision technology theoretically guarantees the accuracy in identifying 
and hitting targets  – “the missiles fired from drones can achieve a degree of accuracy 
that even satellite or laser guided munitions fired from aircraft would have difficulty in 
achieving”.45 Politically, the apology of drone operations is sustained by a discourse of 
rationality in risk avoidance:  
 
[o]ur actions are effective. Dozens of highly skilled core al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb 
makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would 
have targeted international aviation, US transit systems, European cities and our troops in 
Afghanistan. These strikes have saved lives.46  
 
Furthermore, in contrast with the high degree of certainty and control of the 
political/governmental actors as expressed in the statement above, the individuals upon 
the territory under drone surveillance experience constant uncertainty, unpredictability, 
and insecurity of not knowing not only when and where, but also whether they might 
be taken for terrorists according to what they are doing. As experienced by the New 
York Times journalist David Rohde during his time as a hostage in Waziristan, “[t]he 
drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to determine who or what 
they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant 
reminder of imminent death”.47  
The underlying relation of power provides the intervener with the maintenance of 
privileges, whereby US security is upheld, both by fighting the risks of terrorism 
overseas, and by simultaneously avoiding US casualties.48 Ultimately, the use of 
drones in combating terrorism reveals a technique of power, practiced by the 
intervener on foreign ground over individuals, which is characterised by a distancing 
move away from human bodies and the risks they represent for the intervener.  
Another important aspect of this radical dissociation consists in part of the 
altered notions of corporeality and spatiality. Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan approach 
this matter in terms of the non-differentiation of people: bodies become things to track, 
monitor, apprehend and kill. Entering data into a computer propagates the 
dehumanizing abstraction, turning human bodies into spatial coordinates, or simply a 
“bug splat”.49 Drones thus normalise the on-going subjugation of individuals:  
“lumping together innocent civilians with enemy combatants, women and children 
with wanted terrorist leaders” without any particular regard for the political and social 
context.50  
According to Reprieve’s report You never die twice: multiple kills in the US 
drone program death counts within the US Kill List are often inaccurate. The study 
found forty-one names of men who had died multiple times in public reporting. Each 
assassination target died on average more than three times before their actual death. All 
those failed strikes obviously resulted in numerous civilian deaths, including many 
children.51 The section of the report entitled “Who was killed instead?” appears as the 
most valuable interrogation, because it proceeds by showing the faces and the names of 
some of the innocent people targeted by drone strikes: the question that actually leads 
us to the problem of the name, of the designation of bodies, their personalisation and 
humanisation. 
This discovery is not particularly surprising given the account of the 
aforementioned former US drone operators, who argued that they were inflicting 
“heavy civilian casualties and have developed an institutional culture callous to the 
death of children and other innocents”.52 Children appear on screens as “smaller black 
shadows”, and targeting them is often expressed in drone vocabulary as a way of 
“cutting the grass before it grows too long”, according to former US Air Force drone 
operator Michael Haas.53  
Ultimately, following Grégoire Chamayou, we are witnessing a “redistribution of 
priorities: the yield from a policy designed to terrorize and eradicate now takes 
precedent over any consideration of its political effects on the population”.54 
Unfortunately, assessing whether Pakistanis or Somalis living in the areas under 
constant drone surveillance should benefit from life insurance is a secondary and 
residual matter. What is ultimately at stake is that they powerlessly live in a space 
where the insurability of their lives is unlikely to be valued in the near future.  
Excluded from the process, and incapable of responding to the violence that results 
from that process, these subjects live in a context of uninsurability.  
 
2. Differentiated lives and uninsurability   
As argued thus far the use of drones has led to a radical differentiation between 
the “insured” and the “non-insured” life.55 In this section, we intend to further 
elaborate on this by developing the relation between uninsurability and the bodies of 
the security subjects.  
For Mark Duffield, in the insured life, “the contingencies of capitalist existence 
are ameliorated through risk-reducing and compensatory benefits funded through 
contributory social insurance, general taxation, private insurance and personal 
savings”.56 The insured subject lives in the developed world, whereas the non-insured 
is part of the underdeveloped Global South.57 These two worlds are separated by a 
containment policy that “functions as a global perimeter fence both separating and 
reproducing the generic life-chance divide between the developed and the 
underdeveloped worlds”.58 Duffield’s dichotomy in the context of the security-
development nexus points towards a post-colonial positive biopolitical mechanism of 
social self-reliance.59 According to Mark Duffield, “[t]he generic difference between 
how developed-life and underdeveloped-life are supported or expected to live loosely 
defies the spatial geography of the global north and south”.60 Whereas the insured life 
is characterised by “its multiple dependencies and mass consumption”, the non-insured 
life carries “expectations of adaptive self-reliance within the confines of basic 
needs”.61 The non-insured are maintained within the context of a post-interventionist 
society in which war has given place to an “expanding zone of international 
pacification” in which “pacifying low-intensity insurgency is a long-term policing 
problem for the international community”.62  
These zones of international pacification are no longer war zones, but areas 
where it is seen as legitimate to apply forms of external policing with the ultimate aim 
of guaranteeing the success of pre-defined security policies (usually under the shape of 
counter-terrorism). Such policing practices do not aim to provide security to the local 
populations, but rather to prevent security externalities against the interests of the 
intervening countries. The non-insured live in spaces where law does not apply in the 
same way; spaces normalised by these practices of radical differentiation in which 
targeted killings are seen “as standard part of ongoing overseas contingency 
operations”, whose consequences are often terrifying.63 These non-insured lives often 
inhabit in conflict or post-conflict settings; zones of pacification, where development 
and security sector reform policies operate hand in hand with counterinsurgency 
operations.  
The use of drones for killing purposes creates a certain regime of truth in terms 
of the assessment made by the intervener on who is the ‘other’, the terrorist, the 
unlawful one, and who is not. In this context, drones produces a whole new security 
environment in which people are supposed to ‘normally’ go about their lives, while 
being in the same geographic areas in which the US conducts its personality and 
signature strikes64. The latter in particular was supposed to have been phased out with 
Obama's policy change in 2013. However, “[n]early three years later, the 
administration has abandoned any pretense of reigning in its use of signature strikes”.65 
 
Invisible bodies 
In October 2015, The Intercept disclosed a series of secret military documents in 
a collection called the “Drone Papers”. These offer documentary evidence of a US Kill 
List, a covert programme that selects individual targets for assassination.66 In one of 
the Papers, authored by Cora Currier, the process by which the Obama administration 
has acted upon its “list” in Yemen and Somalia is revealed.67 Accordingly, under US 
decisional process for drone strikes, President Obama only approves the targets, but 
not each individual strike. Although an overall count of strikes or deaths is not 
contained, it is noted that “relatively few high-level terrorists meet criteria for 
targeting”. The same Drone Paper refers to numbers provided by the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism to show that, although only 16 targets were authorized in 
Yemen, and 4 in Somalia by the end of June 2012, there were at least 54 drone strikes, 
killing a minimum of 293 people, including 55 civilians in Yemen; and at least 3 
attacks, and minimum 6 people dead in Somalia. Besides, the CIA has reportedly 
created its own list and rules for strikes, which means there are additional strikes and 
deaths to those authorised by the Kill List that occur in the shadow.68  
These facts and numbers lead to the need of discussing the ambiguity and 
controversy of the practice of targeting individuals. As argued by Kyle Grayson,  
 
targeted killing and assassination can be seen as complex and potentially contradictory 
responses. On the one hand, they are the individualization of danger to the extreme, in that an 
existential threat to the species is located – at some moment in time – within the capabilities 
and/or intentions of a single person. On the other hand, the act is not personal: the administrative 
decision to dispatch is not so much a result of ‘who you are’ as of ‘what you are’ or ‘what you 
have been determined to be’ – an existential threat to the survival of the species.69 
 
The decision to target an existential threat based on the assessment of “intentions” or 
“patterns of life” may not be personal per se, but essential meanings are actually 
altered. To Wilcox, it makes the bodies to exist in “dematerialized form, as images and 
information”.70A new meaning emerges that implies that the potential danger 
represented by the individual supplants who the individual actually is. In other words, 
the threat potential of the individuals overpowers the assessment made on his 
personality, corporeal presence, habits, attitudes, and acts. In practice, this becomes all 
the more controversial in the light of the reported targeting of groups of individuals 
based on the mere fact that many gathered bodies are judged suspect of terrorist 
activities. For instance, there have been accounts of follow-up attacks on people 
rescuing the injured of a previous drone strike, on mosques after the locals were 
exhorted to help civilians mistakenly hit, on mourners and funerals.71 This is also 
documented by the Stanford/NYU report regarding the impact of the constant exposure 
to indiscriminate drones in Pakistan on the willingness to rescue victims and provide 
medical assistance, on burial traditions and willingness to attend funerals, and other 
social, economic and cultural activities: “[t]here used to be funeral processions, lots of 
people used to participate… But now, [the US has] even targeted funerals, they have 
targeted mosques, they have targeted people sitting together, so people are scared of 
everything”, says Ibrahim Qasim in the report.72   
 Therefore, put in broad terms, according to Michael Walzer, “this isn't targeted 
killing”, because 
[i]f the targeted insurgent or terrorist leader is surrounded by, or simply in the vicinity of, a group 
of men who are, say, between the ages of fifteen and sixty (and even drone surveillance can’t be 
precise about that), an attack is permitted, and everyone who is killed is counted as a legitimate 
target.73  
 
This is also well illustrated by the case of drone strikes in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, 
where the Afghan military-aged males have been defined as a category of inherently 
dangerous people, leading to “the assimilation of all members of that category to a 
threat that must be eliminated by death, and the further assimilation of all humans in 
sight of the drone to that category”.74  
With drones, different perceptual fields are at play. Although using drones 
implies an improved gaze of the environment and of the subjects on the ground for the 
operator, the imperativeness of time, speed, accuracy and efficacy makes drones to 
dematerialise the contexts they operate in, together with the bodies they destroy. This 
is to say that the immediate material perception enabled by sight largely overpowers 
the political and ethical perception of the human subjects:  
 
[a]ny battlefield is above all a perceptual field, because the primary act is that of aiming, of 
attaining an objective. Once we have seen something, we have already started to destroy it. As 
long as something is invisible, it is protected by its invisibility. Whether it is arrows or stones 
people throw at each other, perception is the determining factor of war.75  
 
Following Virilio’s rationale, if drones enable the constant visibility of objects, they 
are making them vulnerable. Although drones are a material technique of power, 
because of the acceleration of the decisional processes implied by their use, they end 
up surpassing and making obsolete the materiality of bodies, together with their 
political dimension. Therefore, drones separate the human subject from his political 
and ethical importance. It is also in this ideational sense that drones make human 
bodies immaterial.  
This dissociation of the human body from its political core has important 
consequences for the idea of life-valuation. The insured “are entrenched within 
political imaginaries of protection, imaginaries that entail institutionalised ways of 
understanding what it means to promote and safeguard a way of life”.76 However, that 
is not the case for Yemenis and Pakistanis living in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas, for their condition lies at the opposite spectrum of any system of life-valuation. 
That immateriality is reinforced by the US refusal to release information on the 
number of people killed in drone attacks. Although the illegality of US drone strikes 
was recognised for the first time by the High Court in Peshawar as a breach of 
Pakistan’s national sovereignty in May 2013, the civilian deaths by drone strikes in 
those two countries hardly receive an official explanation or answer.77 As a result, the 
non-insured become uninsurable; they are made immaterial in a move that resembles 
Judith Butler’s conception of the “de-realisation of the Other”: 
 
What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality be remade? Those who are unreal have, in 
a sense, already suffered the violence of de-realization. What, then, is the relation between 
violence and those lives considered as “unreal”? Does violence effect that unreality? Does 
violence take place on the condition of that unreality? 
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to 
injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of 
remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because 
they are always already lost or, rather, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. Violence renews 
itself in the face of the apparent inexhaustibility of its object. The de-realization of the ‘Other’ 
means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that 
imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly 
in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy.78  
 
Influenced by Judith Butler, Lauren Wilcox defends a biopolitical reading of the 
“bodies”, which are essentially constituted to be managed and known in contemporary 
practices of violence and security. Regarding precision warfare and the use of drones 
more specifically, Wilcox conceives war as “relationally and asymmetrically embodied 
in the figure of the posthuman, a figure that enables not only the destruction of bodies, 
but the production of those bodies as ungrievable, as bodies that never existed in the 
first place”.79 Wilcox’s contribution crucially highlights the epistemological 
implications of how precision warfare makes civilian bodies “unknowable”, physically 
“killable” and how the absence of body counts makes them also “abject”, “unseen” and 
“ungrievable” bodies.80 Once again, former drone operator of the US Air Force 
Michael Haas sustains this idea: “Ever step on ants and never give it another thought? 
That’s what you are made to think of the targets – as just black blobs on a screen. […] 
You had to kill a part of your conscience to keep doing your job every day – and 
ignore those voices telling you this wasn’t right”.81 This “detachment” and “lack of 
empathy for human life” expressed by Haas are to work as facilitating factors to kill 
just “terrorists” and not people.82   
Here, the de-realisation of the Other is created by the inherent psychological 
distance between the drone operators and their human targets, who are only blurred 
images that detach them from human characteristics and reduce them to the status of 
possible terrorists. As argued by Grégoire Chamayou “[w]arfare, from being possibly 
asymmetrical, becomes absolutely unilateral”.83 The impossibility of response, the 
irrevocability of death, the negation of mourning, all concur to the de-politicisation of 
life and death in the context of the war on terror.  
The reality of these invisible, uninsurable, bodies is also the reality of the new 
marginal spaces of the international system. These new spaces are not geographically 
bound, but they result from the articulation between space, body, and machine. Their 
marginality results from the combination of these three elements. Space, because they 
live in areas where they are already non-insurable: if they were living in the Global 
North, they would not run the risk of being targeted by a Predator or a Reaper. In the 
same vein, they are only uninsurable because that is made possible by the use of 
UCAVs. Technology grants their inexistence as individuals.    
 
 
Contesting invisibility  
As in any power relation, even those living in uninsurable lands have some 
margin for resistance. Uninsurability is not an entirely irreversible condition. In 
Pakistan, for instance, there is plenty public awareness and contestation regarding the 
use of drones, which may be verified in the public manifestations claiming for the 
visibility of civilian bodies, because in many cases bodies disappear and are never to 
be found. One example is the “#notabugsplat#” initiative, an artistic manifestation set 
in a heavily bombed region of Pakistan, Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, that is destined to be 
seen by Predator drone operators and satellites, to raise awareness of civilian 
casualties.84 Viewed from the sky, the art installation reflects the face of an innocent 
child victim.  
 [FIGURE 1] 
 
 
Another is the story of Noor Behram told by Steve Coll. Behram is a Pakistani 
journalist who documents the drone attacks for the Foundation for Fundamental 
Rights, a Pakistani non-profit organisation that seeks redress for civilian casualties. 
Among other things, Behram has continuously photographed the sites of drone attacks 
to create a partial record of the dead, the wounded, and their detritus.85  
These cases are clear evidences that Pakistani civilians essentially demand visibility, 
claiming for the “realisation” of their bodies. These initiatives are clearly a “petition 
for recognition”, a solicitation for “becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition 
the future always in relation to the Other”; a petition for political recognition, or at 
least for some form of security.86 
 
 
Conclusion  
This article attempted to broaden the understanding of the use of drones as a 
radical form of power. It was seen that drones express the idea of radicality by bringing 
into the field of security new interrelated perceptions of space, time and corporeality 
that originate new relations of power. These are translated into a situation of 
fundamental uninsurability for the security subjects.  
Virilio’s notions helped conceiving that drones may enhance the material 
dimension of the contexts drones operate in through magnified imaging, but that they 
also end up dematerialising the human subjects’ political dimension, stripping them of 
further ethical consideration. By approaching the use of drones against terrorism, it 
was shown how their use allows the intervener to perpetuate its presence in the 
margins of the Global South. As described by Chamayou: 
[drones] inflict mass terror upon entire populations. It is this […] that is the effect of permanent 
lethal surveillance: it amounts to a psychic imprisonment within a perimeter no longer defined 
by bars, barriers, and walls, but by the endless circling of flying watchtowers up above.87  
 
Beyond the lives of the many innocent victims directly taken by drones, the 
negative contours of targeted killing have expanded to the lives of those who remain, 
both survivors and operators who do not always embody the interests of the intervener. 
By transferring the risk of death exclusively to the subject of security, drone strikes 
establish an asymmetric relation of superiority in favour of the intervener, thus 
revealing their power to alter the meanings of what lives are worth, of how they are 
valued.  
This relation of domination consequently locates subjects outside the margins of 
the already non-insured life. They are underdeveloped life unmerited of being part of 
the security policies that are operationalised via Reapers and Predators that lethally 
control their skies. And this leads to a final and most concerning paradox: although 
boundless in terms of its potential use, the deployment of drones as killing weapons 
have in practice generated a new biopolitical frontier in world politics: that between 
the non-insured and the uninsured, thus radicalising the metaphorical distinction 
presented by Mark Duffield. In the final section of this paper it was seen how the 
uninsured are finding alternative forms of making their presence felt through art and 
social media; ways of making themselves visible and thus potentially insurable. 
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